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HORNE V. DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE: 
JUST COMPENSATION LEFT TO 
WITHER ON THE VINE 
MICHAEL P. COLLINS, JR.∗ 
Like many agricultural products sold in the United States, the price of 
raisins fluctuated erratically during the early twentieth century.  In response, 
Congress empowered the United States Department of Agriculture 
(“USDA”) to stabilize raisin prices.  Since 1949, the USDA has attempted 
to stabilize raisin prices through marketing orders which prohibit a certain 
percentage of the annual raisin crop from being sold on the open market.1  
In Horne v. Department of Agriculture,2 the Supreme Court considered 
whether one such price control, which required raisin producers to 
surrender a portion of their crops to the federal government, amounted to a 
taking under the Fifth Amendment.3  Ultimately, the Court concluded that 
the program did in fact amount to a taking, and required the government to 
pay “just compensation” for the raisins.4  The Court chose not to remand for 
further determination of whether the Hornes should be compensated, but 
instead held that the claimants should be refunded for the fines issued by 
the federal government following non-compliance with the USDA 
program.5 
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 1.  Horne v. USDA, 750 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).   
 2.  135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).   
 3.  Id.  The Fifth Amendment provides, in relevant part, “nor shall private property be taken 
for public use, without just compensation.”  U.S. CONST. amend. V.   
 4.  Id. at 2433.   
 5.  Id. 
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When considering just compensation, the Court failed to examine 
whether the Hornes were compensated, at least partially, through the USDA 
raisin program.6  Rather than quickly dismissing the government’s claim 
that the raisin program may not require compensation, the Court should 
have remanded for a further determination of just compensation.7  
Remanding would have accounted for the fair market value of the raisins 
without the price support program and the benefits received by the Hornes 
as a result of the regulatory activities provided by the government.8  The 
Court’s failure to do so will have far-reaching consequences.  Namely, the 
Horne decision will enable future takings claimants to receive more than 
“just compensation.”9 
I.  THE CASE 
In 2002, the Hornes, raisin growers in California who grew frustrated 
with the USDA’s attempts at price stabilization, implemented a plan to skirt 
USDA regulations.  They were fined for selling their raisin crop in direct 
violation of the USDA’s price stabilization program.  The Hornes then sued 
to recover the cost of the fines.  This Section discusses the origins of the 
USDA regulations, the actions of the Hornes, and the subsequent legal 
action against them. 
A.  The Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act and the Raisin 
Marketing Order 
From 1914 to 1921, raisin prices in the United States increased 
rapidly, peaking at a price of $235 per ton.10  This surge in prices led to an 
increase in production by the nation’s raisin producers, which then caused 
prices to plummet back to normal levels of $40 to $60 per ton.11  Following 
this sharp increase in raisin production and the subsequent decline in the 
price of raisins, the industry sold raisins “at less than parity prices and in 
some years at prices . . . less than the cost of production.”12  In 1937, 
Congress passed the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act (“AMAA”) in 
                                                          
 6.  Id. at 2431–33.  
 7.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 8.  See infra Part IV.A. 
 9.  See infra Part IV.B. 
 10.  Horne v. USDA, 750 F.3d 1128, 1133 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).  
Two hundred and thirty-five dollars in 1921, when adjusted for inflation, amounts to more than 
$3100 in 2016.  CPI Inflation Calculator, BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, http://data.bls.gov/cgi-
bin/cpicalc.pl?cost1=235&year1=1921&year2=2016 (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).  For reference, 
the price of raisins in 2015 was $1600 per ton, an increase from 2014.  2015 Announced Natural 
Seedless Field Price, RAISIN BARGAINING ASSOCIATION, 
http://www.raisinbargaining.org/newsletter/ (last visited Feb. 21, 2016).   
 11.  Horne, 750 F.3d at 1133. 
 12.  Id. (quoting Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 364 (1943)).   
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an attempt to bring consistency and predictability to agricultural markets in 
the United States.  The AMAA authorizes the Secretary of Agriculture to 
distribute marketing orders regulating the sale and delivery of various 
agricultural goods for the purpose of price stabilization.  In 1949, as a direct 
response to the market conditions of the early twentieth century, the 
Department of Agriculture implemented the Marketing Order Regulating 
the Handling of Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California 
(“Raisin Marketing Order”).13 
One of the main purposes of the Raisin Marketing Order is to ensure 
“orderly” market conditions through regulating raisin supply.14  The Raisin 
Marketing Order stabilizes raisin prices15 by establishing annual reserve 
pools, the size of which is determined according to annual crop yield.16  The 
reserve raisins are known as “reserve tonnage” and may not be sold on the 
open market.  This restriction limits the amount of surplus raisins for sale 
domestically and indirectly controls the price of raisins in the United 
States.17  The Raisin Marketing Order established the Raisin Administrative 
Committee (“RAC”), an industry committee charged with administration of 
the Raisin Marketing Order.18  Each year, the RAC recommends the amount 
of reserve tonnage (raisins which must be held in reserve for the RAC) and 
free tonnage raisins (raisins which may be sold on the open market) to the 
Secretary of Agriculture, who then promulgates the percentages.19  
Marketing orders under the AMAA, such as the Raisin Marketing Order, 
apply only to “handlers,” that is, those who pack and process agricultural 
products for distribution.20  The orders do not apply to a producer or grower 
operating “in his capacity as a grower.”21  According to the AMAA, any 
                                                          
 13.  Id.  
 14.  7 U.S.C. § 602(1) (2012); Horne, 750 F.3d at 1133.  The Raisin Administrative 
Committee (“RAC”) marketing order remains in effect, however, since 2010–2011, the RAC has 
not recommended a reserve percentage, meaning that handlers are free to sell all of the raisin crop 
on the open market.   
 15.  Between 1920 and the Raisin Marketing Order’s implementation in 1949, the market 
surplus for raisins had consistently been thirty to fifty percent.  Horne v. USDA, 673 F.3d 1071, 
1075 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013) (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341, 363–64 
(1943)), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013), remanded to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. 
Ct. 2419 (2015).   
 16.  7 U.S.C. § 608(c)(6)(E) (2012); Horne, 673 F.3d at 1075; 7 C.F.R. §§ 989.54(d), 989.65 
(2014).  
 17.  Horne, 673 F.3d at 1075.   
 18.  7 C.F.R. §§ 989.35, 989.36 (2014); Horne, 673 F.3d at 1075.   
 19.  Horne, 673 F.3d at 1075–76. 
 20.  7 U.S.C. §§ 608(c)(1), 608(c)(13)(B) (2012); Horne, 673 F.3d at 1074–75. 
 21.  7 U.S.C. §§ 608(c)(1), 608(c)(13)(B) (2012); Horne, 673 F.3d at 1074–75. 
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handler failing to comply with the terms of a marketing order is subject to 
civil forfeiture, as well as to civil and criminal penalties.22 
As a result of the reserve tonnage requirement, a producer only 
receives payment from handlers for the free tonnage raisins.23  The handler 
may then sell the free tonnage raisins on the domestic raisin market without 
restrictions.24  The handlers must set aside reserve tonnage raisins in 
separate bins for the RAC.  The RAC then sells these raisins on export 
markets or directs that they be distributed on secondary-noncompetitive 
markets, either by direct sale or by gift to various federal agencies.25  The 
proceeds from the reserve tonnage sales are then used to finance the 
administration of the RAC.26  Any remaining proceeds are distributed to 
producers on a pro rata basis.27  Upon delivery to handlers, producers 
surrender all property interests in the reserve tonnage raisins, aside from the 
potential of sharing in the RAC’s profits.28  During the years at issue in this 
case, however, no profits were distributed from the RAC back to the raisin 
producers.29 
B.  The Hornes’ Raisin Activities 
In 1969, Marvin and Laura Horne began farming raisins in the Fresno 
and Madera Counties of California.30  In 1999, they registered Raisin 
Valley Farms (“Raisin Valley”) as a California general partnership.31  The 
Hornes also own and operate Lassen Vineyards, another general partnership 
registered in California.32  Frustrated with what they viewed as an outdated 
and exploitive regulatory structure, the Hornes implemented a plan to bring 
their raisins to market without the use of a third-party handler.  Instead, the 
Hornes purchased or leased equipment to handle their own raisin crops.  
The Hornes then performed the traditional function of a handler with 
respect to the raisins they produced.33  Accordingly, Lassen Vineyards 
handled raisins produced by Raisin Valley and those produced by a 
collection of sixty other raisin farmers in California.  Records filed with the 
                                                          
 22.  7 U.S.C. §§ 608(a)(5)–(6), 608(c)(14)(B) (2012).  Section 608(c)(14)(B) authorizes civil 
penalties up to $1000 per violation with each day that the violation continues constituting a 
separate violation.  7 U.S.C. § 608(c)(14)(B).  
 23.  7 C.F.R. § 989.65; Horne, 673 F.3d at 1076.   
 24.  Horne, 673 F.3d at 1076; 7 C.F.R. § 989.65. 
 25.  7 C.F.R. §§ 989.65, 989.67, 989.167; Horne, 673 F.3d at 1076.   
 26.  7 C.F.R. §§ 989.65, 989.67, 989.167; Horne, 673 F.3d at 1076.    
 27.  7 U.S.C. § 608(c)(6)(E); 7 C.F.R. § 989.66(h); Horne, 673 F.3d 1071 at 1076. 
 28.  Horne, 673 F.3d at 1076.   
 29.  Id.  
 30.  Id. 
 31.  Id.  
 32.  Id.  
 33.  Id.  
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USDA indicate that Lassen Vineyards “packed-out” more than 1.2 million 
pounds of raisins during the 2002–2003 crop year and more than 1.9 million 
pounds in the 2003–2004 crop year.34  The Hornes anticipated that such an 
arrangement would not require them to abide by the USDA’s marketing 
order, including the annual reserve requirement.35 
During the 2002–2003 and 2003–2004 crop years,36 Lassen Vineyards 
never acquired title to the raisins of other producers, but instead charged the 
producers a per-pound fee for packing services.37  The Hornes then 
marketed and sold the raisins of the California producers to wholesale 
customers, while the producers retained full ownership of the raisins.38  
According to this arrangement, the Hornes did not believe that they fell 
within the definition of a “handler” as outlined by the AMAA.  Therefore, 
the Hornes did not expect that the requirements of the Raisin Marketing 
Order, most importantly, the requirement to set aside reserve tonnage 
raisins, would apply to their activities.39  For the Hornes, the reserve 
tonnage requirement was 632,427 pounds for the 2002–2003 crop year and 
611,159 pounds for the 2003–2004 crop year.40 
C.  Legal Action Against the Hornes 
On April 1, 2004, the Administrator of the Agricultural Marketing 
Service levied an action against the Hornes, alleging numerous violations of 
the AMAA and failure to comply with the Raisin Marketing Order.41  The 
complaint also alleged that the Hornes acted as handlers under the AMAA 
and violated the AMAA by failing to hold raisins in reserve for the RAC.42  
A hearing on the administrator’s complaint took place February 9–11, 
2005.43  Following the hearing, the Administrative Law Judge (“ALJ”) 
issued a decision and order finding that the Hornes acted as handlers of 
raisins and were therefore subject to the Marketing Order.44  The ALJ 
ordered the Hornes to pay $731,500 in civil penalties, $9389.73 in 
assessments, and an additional $523,037 for the dollar equivalent of the 
                                                          
 34.  Id. at 1077.   
 35.  Id. at 1076. 
 36.  The crop year for raisins begins on August 1 and ends on July 31 of the following year.  
Horne v. USDA, No. CV-F-08-1549 LJO SMS, 2009 WL 4895362, at *2 n.1 (E.D. Cal. Dec. 11, 
2009), aff’d,  673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013), remanded to 750 F.3d 
1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. (2015).   
 37.  Horne, 673 F.3d at 1077. 
 38.  Id.  
 39.  Id.  
 40.  Id.  
 41.  Horne, WL 4895362, at *5. 
 42.  Id.  
 43.  Id.  
 44.  Id.  
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raisins that the Hornes failed to hold in reserve.45  Subsequently, the Hornes 
appealed the ALJ’s decision.  A USDA Judicial Officer found that the 
Hornes were liable for several violations.46  Notably, the Judicial Officer 
concluded that the Hornes were liable for 592 violations for their failure to 
hold raisins in reserve according to the Raisin Marketing Order.47  
Accordingly, the Judicial Officer ordered the Hornes to pay $483,843.53, 
the alleged equivalent of the withheld raisins that otherwise would have 
been set aside for the reserve requirement (632,427 pounds in 2002–2003 
and 611,159 pounds in 2003–2004), $202,600 in civil penalties, and 
$8783.39 in unpaid assessments.48  The Hornes subsequently filed an action 
in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, 
seeking judicial review of the USDA’s final decision.49 
On cross-motions for summary judgment, the court granted summary 
judgment for the government.50  The district court explained that the ALJ 
relied on ample evidence to support the fact that the Hornes were handlers 
according to the AMAA.51  As handlers, the Hornes were required to 
submit the mandated reserve percentage of their raisin crop to the RAC.52  
The court rejected the Hornes’ argument that they were producers, and 
therefore, they were exempt from the requirements of the AMAA.53  While 
the Hornes may have produced some of the raisins at issue, they also 
provided all of the handling.  Therefore, the court concluded the Hornes 
operated as handlers under the AMAA.54 
The Hornes then filed a timely appeal in the United States Court of 
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.55  Before the Ninth Circuit, the Hornes made 
three arguments: First, they were producers of raisins and therefore not 
subject to the Raisin Marketing Order’s requirements;56 second, even if 
subjected to the provisions of the Raisin Marketing Order, the reserve 
                                                          
 45.  Id.  
 46.  The Judicial Officer found the Hornes liable for twenty violations of 7 C.F.R. § 989.73 
(filing inaccurate reports), fifty-eight violations of 7 C.F.R. § 989.52(d) (failing to obtain 
incoming inspections), two violations of 7 C.F.R. § 989.80 (failing to pay assessments to the 
RAC), and one violation of 7 C.F.R. § 989.77 (failing to allow the Agricultural Marketing Service 
to access records).  Horne v. USDA, 673 F.3d 1071, 1077 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 
(2013), remanded to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
 47.  Horne, 673 F.3d at 1077. 
 48.  Id.  The Judicial Officer found fewer violations and therefore issued a smaller fine.   
 49.  Id. 
 50.  Horne, WL 4895362, at *28.   
 51.  Id. at *11–13. 
 52.  Id. at *9. 
 53.  Id. at *8–9. 
 54.  Id. at *9. 
 55.  Horne v. USDA, 673 F.3d 1071 (9th Cir. 2012), rev’d, 133 S. Ct. 2053 (2013), remanded 
to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015). 
 56.  Id.  
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requirement constituted an uncompensated per se taking in violation of the 
Fifth Amendment’s Takings Clause;57 and finally, the penalties imposed by 
the Judicial Officer violated the Eighth Amendment’s Excessive Fines 
Clause.58  Regarding their first argument, the court deferred to the judgment 
of the USDA and concluded that the Hornes ought to be considered 
handlers for purposes of the Raisin Marketing Order.59  Additionally, the 
court held that the fines imposed by the Judicial Officer did not violate the 
Eighth Amendment, reasoning that the Hornes failed to demonstrate that the 
fines imposed were “grossly disproportional to the gravity of [the] 
offense.”60  The court also rejected the Hornes’ Fifth Amendment takings 
claim, explaining that the Tucker Act61 required the Hornes to first bring 
their takings claim before the Court of Federal Claims.62  Unfortunately, the 
court did not consider the substantive issues surrounding the Hornes’ 
takings claim. 
The Hornes then filed a petition for writ of certiorari before the 
Supreme Court of the United States.  The Court granted certiorari on the 
sole issue of whether the Ninth Circuit had jurisdiction to review the 
Hornes’ takings claim.63  Writing the unanimous opinion of the Court, 
Justice Clarence Thomas explained that AMAA withdraws Tucker Act 
jurisdiction over a handler’s takings claim.  As a result, there was no 
alternative remedial scheme through which the Hornes must proceed before 
obtaining their claim under the AMAA.64  The Court reversed the Ninth 
Circuit and remanded for a further determination on the Hornes’ takings 
claim.65 
On remand, the Ninth Circuit considered, and ultimately rejected, the 
Hornes’ takings claims.66  The court relied on two landmark decisions, 
Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.67 and Lucas v. South 
Carolina Coastal Council,68 in holding that the Hornes did not suffer a 
taking requiring compensation.  The court reasoned that the USDA’s 
actions regarding the Hornes’ raisins did not constitute a per se taking 
                                                          
 57.  Id.  
 58.  Id.  
 59.  Id. at 1078.   
 60.  Id. at 1080–82 (quoting United States v. Bajakajian, 524 U.S. 321, 334 (1998)). 
 61.  The Tucker Act vests jurisdiction over takings claims, “founded either upon the 
Constitution or any Act of Congress or any regulation of an executive department” in the Court of 
Federal Claims.  Horne v. USDA (Horne I), 133 S. Ct. 2053, 2062 (2013) (quoting 28 U.S.C. 
§ 1491(a)(1) (2012)), remanded to 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).   
 62.  Horne, 673 F.3d at 1080. 
 63.  133 S. Ct. 638 (2012).   
 64.  Id. at 2062–63. 
 65.  Id. at 2064. 
 66.  Horne v. USDA, 750 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2014), rev’d, 135 S. Ct. 2419 (2015).   
 67.  458 U.S. 419 (1982).   
 68.  505 U.S. 1003 (1992).   
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because Loretto and Lucas hold that per se takings occur only when there is 
a permanent physical occupation or when the original property owner is 
deprived of all economic value.69  The Hornes retained an ownership stake 
in the raisins (though slight) and benefited from the activities of the RAC.  
Therefore, the court held the reserve requirement of the Raisin Marketing 
Order did not effect a taking on the Hornes.70  Furthermore, the court relied 
on Dolan v. City of Tigard71 and Nollan v. California Coastal 
Commission72 to hold that the reserve requirement was akin to a use 
restriction, similar to a government condition on the grant of a land use 
permit. 
The Hornes appealed once again, and the Supreme Court granted 
certiorari to answer three questions.  First, “[w]hether the government’s 
‘categorical duty’ under the Fifth Amendment to pay just compensation 
‘when it physically takes possession of an interest in property’ . . .  applies 
only to real property and not to personal property.”73  Second, “[w]hether 
the government may avoid the categorical duty to pay just compensation for 
a physical taking of property by reserving to the property owner a 
contingent interest in a portion of the value of the property, set at the 
government’s discretion.”74  And finally, “[w]hether a governmental 
mandate to relinquish specific, identifiable property as a ‘condition’ on 
permission to engage in commerce effects a per se taking.”75 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment provides, “nor shall 
private property be taken for public use, without just compensation.”76  
Regulatory takings occur when a government action significantly curtails 
property rights but does not exercise eminent domain authority.77  The 
Supreme Court’s decisions in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon78 and Penn 
Central Transportation Co. v. New York City79 have served as the 
foundation of modern Takings Clause jurisprudence.80  According to the 
modern doctrine, while the state possesses the power to regulate property, 
                                                          
 69.  Horne, 750 F.3d at 1139–41.   
 70.  Id. 
 71.  512 U.S. 374 (1994).  
 72.  483 U.S. 825 (1987).   
 73.  Horne v. USDA (Horne II), 135 S. Ct. 2419, 2425 (2015) (citing Ark. Game & Fish 
Comm’n v. United States, 133 S. Ct. 511, 518 (2012)).   
 74.  Id. at 2428.   
 75.  Id. at 2430.   
 76.  U.S. CONST. amend. V.   
 77.  See infra Part II.A.  
 78.  260 U.S. 393 (1922).   
 79.  438 U.S. 104 (1978).   
 80.  See infra Part II.A.  
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when such regulation “goes too far,” such action will amount to a taking.81  
Upon determining that a taking has occurred, regulatory or otherwise, 
courts must consider the amount of compensation due to the property 
owner.82  When making a determination of just compensation, the Supreme 
Court requires consideration of any benefits the property owner incurred as 
a result of the taking.83 
A.  The Origins of the United States Supreme Court’s Modern Takings 
Framework—Mahon, Penn Central, and Subsequent Applications 
Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon and Penn Central Transportation 
Co. v. New York City constitute the bedrock of modern regulatory takings 
jurisprudence.84  Following Mahon and Penn Central, the Court has 
articulated two categories as the main divisions of the per se takings: 
permanent physical occupation85 and complete deprivation of all economic 
use.86 
1.  Mahon and Penn Central Tests 
In 1922, in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, the Court considered 
whether a regulation amounted to a taking, and therefore, required just 
compensation pursuant to the Fifth Amendment.87  The Court considered 
whether compensation following a taking of merely a portion of land, for 
purposes of a public road, should be offset by the benefits bestowed upon 
the property owner as a direct result of the taking.88  At that time, the statute 
eliminated a property interest retained by coal companies in the mining 
rights beneath residential properties.89  The Pennsylvania statute completely 
abrogated any right the coal companies retained in the coal.90  The Court 
ruled that the statute in question amounted to a taking, requiring just 
compensation.91  Quoting a decision from the Supreme Court of 
Pennsylvania, the Court stated, “[f]or practical purposes, the right to coal 
consists in the right to mine it.”92  Justice Holmes stated that, “while 
                                                          
 81.  Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.   
 82.  See infra Part II.B. 
 83.  See infra Part II.B.   
 84.  Lingle v. Chevron U.S.A. Inc., 544 U.S. 528, 537–40 (2005).  
 85.  Loretto v. Manhattan Teleprompter CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 419 (1982).  
 86.  Lucas v. S.C. Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003 (1992).   
 87.  260 U.S. 393 (1922).   
 88.  Id. at 412–13.   
 89.  Id.   
 90.  Id. at 413.  
 91.  Id. at 415. 
 92.  Id. at 414 (quoting Commonwealth v. Clearview Coal Co., 100 A. 820, 820 (Pa. 1917)). 
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property may be regulated to a certain extent, if regulation goes too far it 
will be recognized as a taking.”93 
While Pennsylvania acknowledged the need to maintain the integrity 
of residential property, “a strong public desire to improve the public 
condition is not enough to warrant achieving the desire by a shorter cut than 
the constitutional way of paying for the change.”94  The Mahon Court 
acknowledged a previous coal case, Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania,95 
wherein the Court upheld a similar Pennsylvania statute.96  In Plymouth 
Coal, the Court upheld a Pennsylvania statute requiring that pillars of coal 
remain in abandoned coal mines so that neighboring mines would not suffer 
a collapse, which may injure or kill other miners.97  The distinction in these 
two outcomes rests in that the prohibition on mining the pillars, aimed to 
protect the coal miners, and therefore the coal companies themselves.98 
In Mahon, the Court additionally recognized that when a property 
owner receives “reciprocity of advantage” from the government, no 
compensation need be issued.99  Since Mahon, the Court continues to 
consider reciprocity of advantage when determining whether a taking has 
actually occurred, and further, whether compensation is due.  In Keystone 
Bituminous Coal Association v. DeBenedictus,100 the Court considered 
whether a coal mining regulation similar to that of Mahon amounted to a 
taking.101  Justice Stevens explained that the regulation did not amount to a 
taking since the regulation aimed to support public interests that served the 
entire community.102 
The “too far” test articulated in Mahon has been supplemented by the 
standard announced in Penn Central Transportation Co. v. New York City.  
In Penn Central, the Court again considered the question of whether a 
regulation amounted to a taking.  In 1976, faced with mounting concerns 
that historical buildings would be demolished or otherwise altered as the 
city developed, New York City passed a measure aimed at protecting such 
                                                          
 93.  Id. at 415. 
 94.  Id. at 416.   
 95.  232 U.S. 531 (1914). 
 96.  Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415 (citing Plymouth Coal Co. v. Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531 
(1914)). 
 97.  Plymouth Coal Co., 232 U.S. at 539–40. 
 98.  Mahon, 260 U.S. at 415.  
 99.  Id.   
 100.  480 U.S. 470 (1987).   
 101.  Id.  Specifically, the regulation at issue empowered the Pennsylvania Department of 
Environmental Resources to prevent the mining of coal that could cause ground collapses and 
building damages.  Id. at 476.   
 102.  See id. at 491 (“The Court’s hesitance to find a taking when the State merely restrains 
uses of property that are tantamount to public nuisances is consistent with the notion of 
‘reciprocity of advantage’ . . . .  While each of us is burdened somewhat by such restrictions, we, 
in turn, benefit greatly from the restrictions that are placed on others.”). 
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locations.103  The City required that buildings designated as historic 
landmarks remain unaltered unless the City issued prior approval.104  In the 
event that the City did not approve the building for further development, the 
development rights could be sold to neighboring buildings not designated as 
historic landmarks.105  When the City rejected a development plan from 
Penn Central Transportation Co. to construct an office building above 
Grand Central Terminal, Penn Central brought suit alleging that the City 
regulation amounted to a taking requiring compensation.106 
The Court upheld the statute, reasoning that among the several factors 
important in the factual analysis of whether a taking has occurred are the 
“impact of the regulation on the claimant, and particularly the extent to 
which the regulation has interfered with distinct investment-backed 
expectations.”107  The Court explained that the property rights have “not 
been abrogated; they are made transferrable to . . . parcels in the vicinity of 
the Terminal. . . .”108  Other government actions may not result in a 
confiscation of property such that all property rights are destroyed.109  In 
some instances, the state may take action that allows for the retention of 
property ownership while restricting some use of the property.110 
2.  Per Se Takings—Physical Occupation and Complete 
Deprivation of Economically Valuable Use 
Following the Mahon and Penn Central tests, in Loretto v. Manhattan 
Teleprompter CATV,111 the Supreme Court considered whether a New York 
law requiring landlords to allow for a television company to install cable 
components on the property of landlords without compensation violated the 
Takings Clause.112  The Court ultimately concluded that the permanent 
installations amounted to a taking according to the Fifth Amendment and 
required payment of compensation.113  The Court recognized, “[p]roperty 
rights in a physical thing have been described as the rights ‘to possess, use 
and dispose of it.’”114  When the government permanently and physically 
occupies property, “it effectively destroys each of these rights.”115  Unlike a 
                                                          
 103.  Penn Cent. Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 108–09 (1978).   
 104.  Id. at 110–11.   
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use restriction, such action requires compensation since the owner has no 
control over the “timing, extent, or nature of the invasion.”116  Under such 
circumstances, the regulation amounted to a taking.117 
Additionally, in Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council,118 the Court 
further explained which types of regulatory takings will require 
compensation.119   The Court considered whether a regulation prohibiting 
any development of a beachfront property amounted to a taking.120  The 
Court held that a regulation that diminishes all economic value of a 
property, amounted to a taking.121 
B.  The Supreme Court Requires Consideration of Benefits Incurred by 
a Property Owner When Determining Just Compensation 
When a court determines that a taking has occurred, the court must 
then consider the amount of compensation owed.  The Takings Clause is 
designed “not to limit the governmental interference with property rights 
per se, but rather to secure compensation in the event of otherwise proper 
interference amounting to a taking.”122  Broadly, the Supreme Court has 
enforced the Takings Clause as prohibiting the “Government from forcing 
some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and justice, 
should be borne by the public as a whole.”123  Accordingly, when 
determining just compensation, the Court has required consideration of 
benefits or value retained by the property owner.124  Further, given that the 
date of determination of fair market value for property taken can greatly 
affect the amount of compensation due, the Court has explained when such 
valuation should take place.125 
1.  Consideration of Benefits when Determining Compensation 
In 1896, in Bauman v. Ross,126 the Supreme Court acknowledged the 
need for courts to consider benefits incurred by a property owner when 
making a determination of just compensation.  Specifically, the Court 
considered whether compensation following a taking of a portion of 
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 118.  505 U.S. 1003 (1992).   
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property for purposes of a public road could be lessened to offset the 
benefits which the taking bestowed upon the property owner.127  The Court 
ruled that courts should consider benefits incurred by property owners, 
since to disallow such consideration would not be “just compensation” for 
the value of the taken property.128 
Likewise, in 1934, the Court again visited the compensation issue in 
Olson v. United States129 and reiterated the position of Bauman.  In Olson, 
the Court considered whether the special uses and adaptability of the 
property owner’s shoreland should be taken into account when determining 
compensation, after the government obtained a flowage easement.130  A 
property owner is entitled, the Court explained, “to be put in as good a 
position pecuniarily as if his property had not been taken.”131  The Court 
stated that, while a property owner is entitled to compensation when 
property is taken, “[h]e must be made whole but is not entitled to more.”132 
Additionally, the Loretto Court acknowledged that, in cases of 
physical occupation, “a court should consider the extent of the occupation 
as one relevant factor in determining the compensation due.”133  The Court 
explained that, with regard to compensation due to the landlords, a court 
should consider whether the installation of permanent television cables 
along the rooftops actually increased the value of the property.134 
Another way to view the Court’s consideration of benefits is the “net 
harm” rule utilized in Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington.135  There, 
the Court considered Washington’s Interest on Lawyer Trust Accounts 
(“IOLTA”) program.136  The Court determined that while the Washington 
program amounted to a taking, no compensation was due.137  If the client 
funds were deposited in private funds, the Court explained, the accounts 
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would not have generated positive net interest after accounting for fees and 
other administrative costs.138 
2.  Determination of Fair Market Value 
The date of a fair market value determination can greatly affect the 
amount of compensation rendered to a property owner.  Generally, the 
Supreme Court has held that takings are to be valued on the date the 
property is taken.139  The Court, however, has recognized the difficulty of 
determining fair market value when some property does not have a ready-
made market. 
In United States v. Miller,140 the Court recognized the difficulty of 
defining the word “fair” within the meaning of fair market value when 
determining compensation after a taking has occurred.141  Specifically, the 
Court considered whether the trial court properly excluded testimony 
regarding the potential increase in market value of property due to the 
government’s authorization of, and commitment to, a project which would 
greatly increase the value of the property.142  There, the Court stated that 
such value is to be determined “as of the date of taking.”143  Attempting to 
define “market value,” the Court determined that such a valuation should be 
determined by “what a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing 
seller.”144  Ultimately, the Court concluded that when deciding just 
compensation, courts need not consider any increase in the value of 
property following the completion of the government taking.145 
Subsequently, in Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,146 the Court 
again turned to a consideration of when a calculation of just compensation 
should occur.  In 1942, the government condemned the use of a commercial 
laundry for use by the United States Army through 1946.147  At a jury trial 
in 1946, the jury awarded the laundry compensation of $70,000 for each 
year of the condemnation.148  On appeal, Kimball Laundry argued that the 
jury should have considered the difference between the market value of the 
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fee on the date of the taking and its market value on the date of its return.149  
The Court rejected this argument, holding that “determination of the value 
of [the taking] can be approached only on the supposition that free 
bargaining between [the laundry] and a hypothetical lessee . . . would have 
taken place . . . .”150  The Court explained that the proper means of 
determining compensation rested in determining the “market price” of the 
property at the time of the taking.151  The Court also noted that “when the 
property is of a kind seldom exchanged, it has no ‘market price,’ . . . [the 
Court must use] other means of ascertaining value . . . to other potential 
owners enjoying the same rights.”152 
III.  THE COURT’S REASONING 
In Horne v. Department of Agriculture, the Supreme Court, in an 8-1 
majority, reversed the judgment of the Ninth Circuit and held that the 
Horne’s raisins were taken without just compensation.153  The Horne Court, 
in an opinion authored by Chief Justice John Roberts, provided unequivocal 
answers to all three questions of the certiorari petition.  First, the Court held 
that the Fifth Amendment requires the government to pay compensation 
when it physically takes possession of personal property.154  Second, the 
government may not avoid a duty to pay just compensation for a physical 
taking merely by reserving to the original property owner a contingent 
interest in the property, set at the government’s discretion.155  Finally, a 
governmental mandate requiring the surrender of specific, identifiable 
property as a condition to engage in commerce constitutes a per se 
taking.156 
According to the majority, the reserve requirement of the Raisin 
Marketing Order was a direct appropriation of property, not a regulatory 
taking.  Therefore, the Lucas requirement that a regulatory taking deprive a 
property owner of all economic value, before the government must provide 
compensation, did not apply to the Hornes’ case.157  In Horne, the RAC 
actually took title of the raisins and disposed of them as it wished.  Chief 
Justice Roberts carefully explained that the government could prohibit the 
sale of raisins, without effecting a per se taking.158  This fact, the Court 
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explained, does not excuse a physical appropriation without just 
compensation, as the Constitution must provide the means to achieve such a 
goal.159 
Turning to the second question, the Court reasoned that the Raisin 
Marketing Order still amounted to a taking, despite the fact that producers 
retained a contingent property interest in a portion of the value of the 
property.160  The Court explained that when there has been a physical 
appropriation of property, “we do not ask . . . whether it deprives the owner 
of all economically valuable use.”161  The Court differentiated this case 
from Andrus v. Allard,162 a case where the Court found no taking after the 
government prohibited the sale of certain historical artifacts.  The majority 
determined that Andrus did not apply since the possessors of the artifacts 
still retained ownership of the property, whereas the raisin producers 
physically surrendered the raisins to the RAC.163 
The Horne Court also held that a governmental mandate requiring the 
surrender of specific, identifiable property as a condition for permission to 
engage in commerce effects a per se taking.164  The government argued that 
the reserve requirement was not a taking since the raisin producers and 
handlers voluntarily decided to enter into the raisin marketplace.165  Chief 
Justice Roberts relied on Loretto to counter this argument, explaining that 
the law at issue in that case still constituted a taking, requiring just 
compensation even if a landlord could avoid the taking by ceasing to be a 
landlord.166  Furthermore, the Court dismissed a comparison to Ruckelshaus 
v. Monsanto Co.,167 as that case found no taking by the government where 
the property owners surrendered a license to sell dangerous chemicals.168  
The Court explained that raisins are not dangerous chemicals; they are a 
healthy snack.169  The Court also distinguished Horne from Leonard & 
Leonard v. Earle,170 where the Court upheld a Maryland regulation 
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requiring commercial watermen to surrender ten percent of their oyster 
catch to the state.  In that case, the Court viewed the oyster as ferae naturae 
and harvested from state waters.171  In Horne, the raisins were the result of 
the Horne’s hard work and harvested from private land, not a product of 
state-owned property.172 
Finally, the Court concluded that no remand was necessary to 
determine the amount of compensation due.173  The Court reasoned that the 
USDA had already determined that the reserve raisins would have had a 
market value of $483,843.53, and therefore, the government could not 
subsequently disavow that valuation.174 
Justice Breyer, joined by Justice Ginsburg and Justice Kagan, 
concurred in part and dissented in part with the majority.  The concurring 
portion of the opinion agreed that the Raisin Marketing Order effected a 
taking on the Hornes.175  The dissenting portion reasoned that the case 
should be remanded to the Ninth Circuit in order to determine the level of 
compensation due to the Hornes.  Justice Breyer explained that the reserve 
requirement increases the value of free tonnage raisins.176  While the value 
of the raisins taken may exceed the benefit passed on through the increase 
in price of free tonnage raisins, the benefit might equal or exceed the value 
of the raisins taken, in which case, the Raisin Marketing Order does not 
effect a taking.177 
Justice Thomas penned a solo concurrence in response to Justice 
Breyer’s concurring and dissenting opinion. Justice Thomas emphasized 
that the actions of the RAC can scarcely be considered as performing a 
valuable service for the Hornes.178  Therefore, there was no need to remand 
to the Ninth Circuit for a further determination of compensation.179 
Justice Sotomayor authored a solo dissent, in which she reasoned that 
the Raisin Marketing Order did not effect a per se taking since the Hornes 
were not deprived of all of their property rights in the raisins.180  Justice 
Sotomayor relied on Andrus v. Allard for the proposition that governmental 
action reducing the value of property or imposing “a significant 
restriction . . . on one means of disposing” of property is not a per se 
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taking.181  In order for there to be a per se taking, the government must take 
every property right of the owner.182  The dissent reasoned that the Raisin 
Marketing Order did not effectuate a per se taking since the Hornes still 
retained at least one property interest in the raisins surrendered to the RAC: 
the right to receive some compensation following the RAC’s sale of the 
raisins.183  She explained that the majority has blurred the bright line test of 
Loretto and made it harder to determine when government action effects a 
per se taking.184  Justice Sotomayor also explained that, according to 
Leonard and Ruckelshaus, the government could impose the surrender of 
some property as a condition to engage in interstate commerce.185 
IV. ANALYSIS 
In Horne v. Department of Agriculture,186 the Court quickly dismissed 
the claim that the Hornes were compensated, at least to some degree, 
through the USDA marketing program.187  Rather than dismissing this 
argument so abruptly, the Court should have, as urged by Justice Breyer, 
considered the financial benefits of the raisin marketing program when 
determining the compensation for the Hornes.188  Specifically, the Court 
erred in its analysis of the “fair market value” of the raisins.189  When 
determining the award of just compensation for the Hornes, the Court 
utilized the fair market value of the raisins with the RAC price support.190  
Instead, the Court should have remanded for a determination of 
compensation accounting for the benefits bestowed upon the Hornes by the 
RAC program.  This would have allowed for a determination of (1) the fair 
market value without the RAC price support, and (2) the benefits incurred 
by the Hornes as a result of the regulatory activities provided by the 
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RAC.191  Ultimately, the Court’s conclusion regarding calculation of fair 
market value threatens to provide future claimants a means of unjust 
enrichment.192  Horne will likely permit a court to calculate just 
compensation after a taking, rather than the traditional practice of 
determining just compensation before a taking.193 
A.  The Horne Court Provided Unfair Compensation to the Hornes 
Compensation plays a vitally important role in the system of takings 
jurisprudence.194 As many legal scholars have noted, the rights and 
protections against takings are only as strong as the enforcement of these 
protections by the courts.195  For example, a court may be quick to 
determine that a government action amounted to a taking, yet without 
compensation for the taking, such a determination will likely be worthless, 
in economic terms, to the former property owner.196  One would have 
expected the majority in Horne to consider the issue of compensation, given 
the importance such a determination can have on shaping the protection of 
the Takings Clause.  Instead, the Horne Court dismissed any consideration 
of benefits which the RAC price stabilization program bestowed upon the 
Hornes.197  The Court should have followed the rule from United States v. 
Miller,198 setting just compensation at the price a willing buyer would have 
paid to a willing seller.199  The Court also failed to acknowledge the rule 
from Brown v. Legal Foundation of Washington200 requiring that, in the 
event that there is no net harm to the original property owner, no 
compensation is due.201 
1.  The Horne Court Failed to Consider the Price of Raisins 
Without the RAC Price Support Program, as Required by 
Precedent 
Following a determination that a taking has occurred, a further 
determination of fair market value can be especially difficult for courts.  
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Specifically, the paradoxical nature of “fair market value” must be 
acknowledged.  In the context of eminent domain cases, a determination of 
fair market value usually occurs after negotiations for the property fail to 
reach a compromise.202  Fair market value refers to a guess at a price, or put 
another way, a hypothetical consideration of the property’s value had the 
exchange been voluntary rather than compelled.203  In Miller, the Court 
explained that fair market value means the price that a willing buyer would 
pay.204  In Horne, the Court did not consider fair market value, presumably 
because the Hornes found a willing buyer who then purchased the Horne’s 
raisins at the price set by the RAC.205  At first glance, the Hornes selling 
their raisins might indicate that the price they charged reflects the fair 
market value of the property.  This superficial conclusion, however, fails to 
consider the nature of the RAC price stabilization program. 
The price stabilization program operates to increase and stabilize the 
price of raisins per ton by limiting supply.206  The Hornes, however, chose 
not to follow the RAC’s program for price stabilization.  The price of 
raisins that the Hornes received was dependent upon the supply of raisins 
being limited by the reserve requirements set out by the RAC for the 2002–
2003 and 2003–2004 crop years.207  Therefore, although the Hornes found a 
willing buyer for their raisins, the price paid by the buyer was fully 
dependent on the RAC price stabilization program, which the Hornes 
openly rejected.  Without the price stabilization program, the Hornes likely 
would not have found a buyer at the price they ultimately received.  As 
suggested by Justice Breyer, the Hornes would have received a much lower 
price for their raisins in the absence of the RAC price support program 
because, if all raisin farmers could have sold their entire crop, supply would 
have drastically increased.208  The compensation, which the Court 
ultimately issued, was not fair market value as explained by Miller, since 
the compensation was not the price a “willing buyer” would have paid.209  
For this reason, the Court should have remanded for a further determination 
of price per ton for raisins if the price stabilization program were not in 
place. 
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Furthermore, the Horne Court’s decision to award just compensation 
runs counter to the Court’s earlier decision in Brown v. Legal Foundation of 
Washington.210  The RAC could have limited the supply of raisins through 
alternative means.  For example, the RAC could have limited the number of 
raisins harvested each year, or simply limited the amount of raisins 
ultimately sold on the open market.  The Court has previously condoned the 
state’s power to flatly prohibit the sale of agricultural products in the 
pursuit of price stabilization.211  While the RAC program went beyond a 
simple prohibition on the selling of raisins,212 the set-aside program has the 
same effect as a bare prohibition—limiting the supply of raisins in an effort 
to stabilize prices.  Had the Hornes followed RAC regulations, this 
prohibition would have precluded their raisins from purchase by a willing 
buyer. 
In Brown, the regulation in question also placed a limit on what could 
be done with property.213  When the litigants in Brown claimed that the 
limitation required compensation, the Court considered whether the litigants 
would have been compensated by the market in the absence of the 
regulation.214  The Brown Court explained that no compensation was due 
since, without the regulation, the lawyers would not have earned enough 
interest on the trust accounts and in the end, might have actually lost 
money.215  Just as the Brown Court considered whether the litigants would 
have profited without the IOLTA program, the Horne Court should have 
considered the economic impact of ending the RAC set-aside requirement.  
Instead, the Horne Court simply accepted the Hornes’ definition of fair 
market value as the price of raisins with the price stabilization program in 
effect.216 
Temporally, the Horne Court’s decision to value the raisins after a 
taking runs counter to the Court’s previous takings decisions.  In Miller and 
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Kimball Laundry Co. v. United States,217 the Court required the valuation of 
a taking to be determined before the taking occurs.218  In Miller and 
Kimball Laundry, the claimants attempted to receive higher compensation 
after the government actions increased the value of the property.219  
Likewise, in Miller, the Court held the compensation due was that which a 
willing buyer would pay at the time of the taking.220  The Kimball Court 
rejected this argument and required that the value of the taken property was 
the value before the taking occurred.221  The Horne Court failed to reach 
such a conclusion in similar circumstances.  The Hornes based their claim 
on the value of the raisins after the RAC program had already increased the 
price of raisins.222  Such a decision fails to follow the Court’s previous 
decisions in Miller and Kimball Laundry, requiring a valuation of 
compensation before or at the time of the taking.  The Horne decision will 
impact future takings claims, as it may permit takings claimants to receive 
higher levels of compensation.223 
2.  The Horne Court Failed to Consider Additional Regulatory 
Benefits Incurred by the Hornes 
Beyond failing to consider how the RAC price stabilization program 
impacted the price that the Hornes ultimately received, the Horne Court 
also prevented any consideration of the benefits incurred by the Hornes as a 
result of the RAC program.  The Court held that “general regulatory activity 
such as enforcement of quality standards can[not] constitute just 
compensation for a specific physical taking.”224  Instead, the Court should 
have considered the regulatory benefits incurred by the Hornes as a result of 
the RAC enforcement. 
The Court in Armstrong v. United States225 elaborated on the intention 
behind the Fifth Amendment’s prohibition on the taking of private property 
without just compensation.226  Specifically, the Court explained that the 
starting point for takings claims should be whether the “government [is] 
forcing some people alone to bear public burdens which, in all fairness and 
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justice, should be borne by the public as a whole.”227  Right away, the 
Court’s general statement in Armstrong should lead one to question the 
reasoning in Horne.  Several aspects of the RAC price stabilization program 
are intended for the protection of raisin farmers, and not those of the general 
public.  The RAC price stabilization program serves as the best example of 
an exclusive benefit upon the raisin farmers.  Without the price stabilization 
program, the market would be flooded with the entirety of each year’s raisin 
crop.  This would lead to lower prices, which would be economically 
advantageous to the population as a whole.228  Therefore, the RAC price 
stabilization program serves to benefit the farmers themselves.  
Additionally, the RAC oversees quality control of raisins sold in the United 
States.  There may be some merit to the argument that society as a whole 
benefits from the RAC regulation.  The quality control program more likely 
protects the interests of raisin producers, providing peace of mind to 
consumers that the raisins sold in the United States are suitable for 
consumption. 
In his dissent, Justice Breyer reasons that the majority should have 
remanded for a further determination of just compensation accounting for 
these benefits.229  To bolster his position, Justice Breyer relies on the 
Court’s previous decision in Bauman v. Ross.230  In Bauman, the Court 
considered whether an award of just compensation should be lessened by 
accounting for the increase in property value after taking a portion of the 
property for the purpose of a building a public roadway.231  The Court 
concluded that compensation must be adjusted for the benefits incurred 
from a taking.232  In Horne, however, the Court failed to acknowledge the 
need for consideration of these benefits.  Just as the claimants in Bauman 
had a portion of their land taken for public use, the Hornes had a portion of 
their raisin crop taken.  The Court parted with Bauman, refusing to allow 
for any consideration of the benefits received by the Hornes.  The majority 
claims that the government and Justice Breyer fail to cite “support for its 
hypothetical-based approach [regarding benefits incurred by the 
Hornes].”233  Ironically, the majority fails to cite any support to reach the 
conclusion that Bauman should not apply.234  The Court’s decision in 
Kimball Laundry noted that intangibles, such as a business’s goodwill and 
“earning power due to effective organization,” are often more important 
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elements than the value of tangible property.235  If intangibles such as  
goodwill and effective organization should be considered when determining 
just compensation, it seems only fair that intangible benefits such as stable 
raisin prices each year, quality control standards, and promotional activities 
of the RAC should also be considered.  The Horne majority simply 
dismissed reducing just compensation for “general regulatory activity.”236 
The Court’s cabined view of the loss suffered by the Hornes highlights 
the confusion of the majority’s analysis.  The Court considered only the 
value of the raisins taken, without any consideration of the rest of the raisin 
crop, or other benefits incurred by the raisin farmers.  In a sense, the Court 
closed its eyes to the fact that the reserve portion of the crop, the part at 
issue in Horne, was only a portion of the raisin crop.  This highlights a 
recurring theme in taking’s cases—the denominator problem.  The 
“denominator problem” refers to the issue of considering the “scope of the 
‘thing’ subject to devaluation” following a taking.237  Keeping with the 
parlance of the problem’s title, the denominator problem can be best 
understood in the context of a fraction.  The numerator, or the top part of 
the fraction, represents the economic harm to a particular piece of property 
caused by a taking.238  The denominator, or the bottom part of the fraction, 
is the total value of the relevant piece of property, including that which is 
not subjected to the regulation.239  In terms of the denominator problem, the 
Horne Court considered the raisin crop subject to the reserve requirement as 
both the numerator and the denominator.  For the majority, the reserve 
portion of the raisin crop was the beginning, middle, and end of the story.  
Justice Breyer, however, noted the bigger picture, arguing that the entire 
crop, that is, not just the reserve raisins, were impacted and in some way, 
assigned a higher economic value as a result of the RAC program. 
The consideration of benefits incurred as a result of the taking was 
even condoned in one case cited by the majority.  In Loretto v. 
Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp.,240 the Court concluded that the 
mandatory installation of television cables along the rooftops of apartment 
buildings amounted to a taking.241  The Loretto Court acknowledged that 
when determining compensation, some consideration would need to be 
given to the possibility that the apartments increased in value as a result of 
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the installation of the cables.242  Despite the Horne Court’s heavy reliance 
on Loretto in other parts of its analysis, the Court failed to acknowledge 
Loretto’s call to adjust compensation.243 
B.  The Horne Decision Will Facilitate Unjust Enrichment of Future 
Takings Claimants 
The Horne Court should have recognized the benefits received by the 
Hornes as a result of the RAC stabilization program and remanded for a 
further determination regarding the proper level of just compensation, 
accounting for these economic benefits.  The majority dismissed concerns 
that, “this case will affect provisions concerning whether a condemning 
authority may deduct special benefits . . . from the amount of compensation 
it seeks to pay a landowner suffering a partial taking.”244  Instead, the Court 
simply stated, “[such cases] do not create a generally applicable exception 
to the usual compensation rule, based on asserted regulatory benefits of the 
sort at issue here.”245  There are examples of situations, however, where the 
Horne Court’s analysis of just compensation may have a substantial impact 
on the payment of future takings claimants.  Already, courts across the 
United States have relied on Horne as support for ordering increased 
compensation of takings claimants.  Prior to the Court’s decision in Horne, 
the rule that just compensation be determined at the time a taking occurred 
served as a well settled principle of takings jurisprudence.246  Put another 
way, takings claimants could not, prior to Horne, base their claims on the 
value of the property after it is taken and subsequently improved by the 
condemning authority. 
An example from Baltimore, Maryland demonstrates the difference in 
property valuation.  When building Oriole Park at Camden Yards and 
Ravens Stadium in the 1990s, the Maryland Stadium Authority paid nearly 
$100 million to purchase the land for the venues from nearly two dozen 
businesses.247  Before construction began, the Maryland General Assembly 
granted the Maryland Stadium Authority the statutory authority to seek 
condemnation of land for stadium construction.248  According to the Real 
Property chapter of the Maryland Code, “the value of the property sought to 
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be condemned and of any adjacent property . . . shall be determined as of 
the date of the taking . . . .”249  This legislation permitted the Maryland 
Stadium Authority to purchase the land as it was valued before being used 
as prime stadium real estate.  Now, according to the Horne decision, the 
Maryland Stadium Authority would be required to pay top dollar for prime, 
future stadium land.250 
Not even a year after the Court’s decision in Horne, courts and 
litigants are beginning to rely on Horne in an effort to increase 
compensation for takings claimants.251  In Colonial Chevrolet Co. v. United 
States,252 the United States Court of Federal Claims allowed a suit by car 
dealers claiming that their dealerships were taken without compensation 
following the Troubled Asset Relief Program to go forward despite the fact 
that the dealerships were nearly insolvent at the time of the “taking.”253  By 
allowing the case to go forward, the Court of Federal Claims condoned the 
claimants’ reliance on Horne for the proposition that the court should not 
“now consider the issue of economic loss as a result of the government’s 
action” after finding that regulatory benefits cannot be considered.254 
Likewise, on appeal, the litigants cited Horne for the holding that 
courts need not consider hypothetical regulatory benefits.255  The appellant 
alleges that the Horne decision does not permit a hypothetical analysis of 
the value of property without the government action resulting in the 
taking.256  The initial reliance on Horne by the Court of Federal Claims and 
litigants indicates, at least for this small number of cases, that the 
compensation holding from Horne may stand to unjustly enrich takings 
claimants. 
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V.  CONCLUSION 
In Horne v. Department of Agriculture, the Supreme Court determined 
that the RAC raisin marketing program amounted to a taking under the 
Fifth Amendment.257  However, the Court ultimately decided not to remand 
the case for a further determination of just compensation.258  Failing to 
remand for further consideration of compensation contradicts the Court’s 
previous decisions requiring an analysis of whether a property owner 
actually suffered a loss.259  The Court should have remanded for a further 
determination of just compensation.  First, the Court failed to consider the 
proper market value for the reserve tonnage raisins, breaking with precedent 
in failing to consider what a “willing buyer” would have paid for the raisins 
without the RAC price support program.260  Second, the Court failed to 
consider remitting the level of compensation for the Hornes to account for 
the additional financial benefits from the RAC regulatory programs.261  
Going forward, Horne will likely provide future takings claimants 
undeserved compensation.262  By allowing a valuation to be measured after 
a taking occurs, Horne could enable future takings claimants to argue for a 
higher valuation, even when the state’s actions are the only reason the 
property has increased in value.263 
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